The Treaty of Lisbon clause which Eurosceptics should love

By Sunder Katwala / @nextleft

Why do Eurosceptics – who are mourning the signature of Czech President Vaclav Klaus today, which confirms that the Treaty will enter into law across the EU – get so exercised about the Lisbon Treaty? It is because they believe it is an existential question of national survival and the death of national democracy. As Peter Oborne put it on Sunday:

“Much of Europe seems capable of bearing this calamity with irritating equanimity. Not so the Tories. For many, perhaps most, Conservative activists, the Lisbon treaty poses an existential threat to the British state: we cease to be subjects of the Queen and start to become citizens of Europe. Something ancient and of inordinate value will pass away.”

It is the end of Britain as a national democracy. Yet those with slightly longer memories may recall that Eurosceptics said many of the same things particularly in 1972 when Britain joined the EEC in the first place, in their pitched battles against the Major government signing the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, and also about the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties of 1999 and 2003. The real question being debated is Britain’s position in the European Union – and whether we should be in or out.

The specific charge against Lisbon is a red herring. Where are the Eurosceptics who oppose Lisbon yet support Maastricht and Amsterdam, twenty and ten years ago? They now claim that Lisbon makes it so much worse. This is nonsense – not least because Lisbon gives legal force, for the first time in the European Treaties, to what has always been true as a matter of political reality. It is the first EU Treaty to contain an exit clause, which is helpfully summarised in the E!Sharp glossary of EU jargon. This makes clear for the first time the process of departure from the European Union, including making clear provision for an acrimonious departure in the event that an amicable separation proves impossible:

“At present, it is not legally possible for an EU member state to leave the Union. Up until now, all the EU’s treaties have been signed “in perpetuity”. In other words, once you are in, you are in for good. This would change if the Lisbon Treaty enters into force. It contains a so-called “exit clause” which sets out very clearly what a country wishing to quit the EU club needs to do. The state concerned must formally notify all its Union partners of its decision and should then try to negotiate the terms of its withdrawal in the most civilised way possible. If, however, the country cannot negotiate its exit gracefully, it will be considered to have left the EU two years after it first notifies its Union partners of its decision to leave the club.”

For those who believe in the idea that the EU is incompatible with national democracy, Lisbon provides all the tools they need. It is simply a question of political will – and of whether they can win the national democratic argument for the UK leaving the European Union. If the Eurosceptics can not win that argument, we will remain bound in to these multi-lateral arrangements, because we do not choose to leave them and think that it is in our national interest.

So there is no need for a referendum to “unratify Lisbon” when what is perfectly available is a referendum under the terms of Lisbon, whereby the UK could reject the provisions of the Treaty and announce its departure from the post-Lisbon European Union. It would then be up to a UK government to renegotiate any new relationship with the European Union.

Eurosceptics – in UKIP as well as the Tory party – do not often dwell on what they would want to see after withdrawal. This could be EFTA membership, which would involve trade access in return for a substantial payment to the EU budget and an agreeement to meet EU trade standards and market regulations. (That would not look as different to EU membership as Ukippers might dream of, though we would lose our seat at the table in setting those policies we do sign up to, while other areas of EU business would be irrelevant to us). Or it could simply mean sitting outside, in full possession of national sovereignty, with no formal relationship with EU members at all.

Whatever we choose, after Lisbon, it ought to be clear that the decision is up to us. This is well understood by Eurosceptic bloggers like Dizzy Thinks and Tory Bear, who are sticking to their “better off out” principles and calling for an “in or out” referendum under the terms of Lisbon. (Douglas Carswell has in the past argued that the fundamental question is the Treaty of Rome, not that of Lisbon, but he and Daniel Hannan MEP appear to have been uncharacteristically quiet).

This seems to me the honest Eurosceptic position, which is also held by UKIP. It is worth remembering that the Tory blogosphere debate is almost entirely a tactical one, for different approaches between those who overwhelmingly share the view that Britain should get out entirely: a position taken by nine of the top ten Tory bloggers.

I agree that there is a good case for a referendum on British membership to settle the question one way or the other, as the Liberal Democrats have advocated. And it is difficult to see how any other referendum question makes sense. But this option is, strangely, being evaded by those who support British withdrawal from the European Union, yet who now oppose calls for a referendum. It is difficult not to see their alternative demand for a “fundamental renegotiation” of British membership as largely a “false flag” campaign. Many of its most prominent advocates – like Tim Montgomerie of ConservativeHome, who has led the charge this week – support full British withdrawal from the EU yet seem puzzlingly unwilling to advocate a referendum on their core objective. (The most plausible explanation must be that they fear they would lose it: indeed ConservativeHome yesterday made a case against a Lisbon referendum on the grounds that it could be lost).

The case for a “fundamental renegotiation” for a new semi-detached status for Britain is being advocated by those who do not sincerely support it – or believe it would settle the question. Instead, some anti-Europeans are using a Trotskist strategy of making provisional and transitional demands as part of a longer guerrila war of position, combining the demand for Britain to have a different status to other EU members with the threat of a Tory party civil war to make the Major era one “look like a tea party” if Britain does not seem to be in a “fundamentally different” position, halfway to the exit, within five years.

Why not come out and have the real debate: should Britain be in or out?