Turning points: How Labour can look to ’92 for hope

By Keith Moran / @SocialSchism

At the end of March 1990, twenty years ago next week, Poll Tax resistance reached its peak, with mass demonstrations and riots in Trafalgar Square.

Margaret Thatcher was proving as divisive a figure at the end of her long reign as she had been during the biting recession near the beginning. Throughout the summer months, opinion polls depicted Labour leads in the region of 10%-20% over a government in disarray. The Conservatives, fearing electoral meltdown, pushed the panic button and ruthlessly instigated events that by 28th November 1990 would leave the Iron Lady fighting back the tears on the steps of Downing Street.

John Major assumed the leadership and within 18 months confounded many commentators – by winning the 1992 general election, and producing one of the biggest upsets in British electoral history.

Throughout the last month of the campaign, opinion polls largely predicted a Labour win. They were proved to be consistently wrong. In this period, Neil Kinnock achieved a maximum lead over John Major of 7%, with Labour’s average lead being 1.5%. In the final analysis, the Conservatives finished 7.6% ahead of Labour nationally. The red faced professional polling organisations (Gallup, MORI, Harris, et al) went away to look at their methods; sampling mistakes were acknowledged and changes were made for the future.

The narrative of the 1992 campaign – the fightback in the polls, an Opposition who took their eye off the ball in the final weeks and a public still to be convinced that change was the right option– is one that i hope rings familiar in the coming weeks.

1992 was the last time the country went to vote with people not really knowing who would be the Prime Minister by the time they had their morning cornflakes. Will 2010 be as close?

It seemed most unlikely six months ago as Labour languished, but a concerted fightback is under way. If we are to expect a close election this time around, it is worth remembering the topsy-turvy events 18 years ago.

As the 1992 election campaign developed, the Conservatives pitched Major in the role of fighter and underdog, using poor opinion poll ratings as a rallying cry for the troops. Much was made of Major’s “ordinary roots” and situations where he could talk and debate with members of the public were established. There was a move away from the “Meet John Major” talkabouts; these sanitised encounters to a somewhat docile audience were rejected in favour of the famous soapbox. Although overstated as the reason for the eventual Tory victory, the soapbox technique did, however, play to Major’s strengths and, more importantly, played well to the country at large and was a central feature on many nightly news bulletins.

In contrast, Neil Kinnock was presented more formally, with a more presidential feel. Campaign events were tightly stage-managed; as the Tories became more informal, Labour shifted in the opposite direction. Grand set pieces were preferred, culminating in the now infamous “Sheffield Rally”. Footage of Neil Kinnock arriving by helicopter, greeting a febrile crowd with howls of “We’re alright, we’re alright!” still linger long in the mind. The day after the event, one week before the election, Labour’s lead in the polls dropped markedly.

As the polls further narrowed in the final week of the campaign, Labour became hampered by protracted discussions about the possibility of a hung parliament. Whilst the Tories stirred and painted a picture of secret deals between Kinnock and Ashdown, in interviews Kinnock himself squirmed, refusing to commit one way or the other. That the matter was not dealt with early and decisively lost Labour vital ground as they covered an increasingly exposed flank instead of attacking the government.

Underpinning all of these events, the Conservatives’ superior campaign budget went to work on creating the fear of a tax and spend Labour administration. Saatchi & Saatchi’s posters were to be seen everywhere: “Labour’s Double Whammy”, “Labour’s Tax Bombshell” etc – rather blatant misrepresentations of Labour proposals they may have been, but the message lodged deep into the minds of swing voters.

In 1992 the country knew Labour had changed, but ultimately too few floating voters concluded the party had changed enough. The seeds of doubt were exploited to the full by the Tory machine who convinced middle England that a Labour win would leave them worse off in the pocket.

In the build up to the 2010 general election, we again have an opposition with consistent – if narrowing – poll leads. On the surface, Cameron’s Conservatives are viewed in less threatening terms than previous incarnations. However, trust issues nonetheless remain, and 2010 is therefore more likely to mirror 1992 than 1997, or any election since.

Neither of the major parties have yet, to coin American parlance, sealed the deal with the public. Labour activists sense the suspicion in which the Tories are held, and strategists are more than aware of the opportunity this provides.

Cameron, a man of few discernible principles, produces the occasional “passionate” speech, yet all are highly opaque. Any gaps in the Tory message in the closing weeks of the campaign need to be ruthlessly exploited by Labour, thus reducing the possibility of voters giving the Conservatives the benefit of the doubt – because the “benefit” of such doubt serves no benefit at all when it offers chancellor Osborne the purse strings of the nation.

And if Cameron and his inner clique elect to release more policy detail to counter the perceived threat of their potential government, even more opportunity is presented: we have already witnessed, briefly, a Tory Party offering policy on the run and it was not pretty.

Meanwhile, Gordon Brown’s own record in the financial crisis and the subsequent action he chose to take has taken some edge off what may otherwise have been a prolonged downturn. Talk of three million plus unemployed now looks wide of the mark.

Cameron, a politician not known to shy away from shameless opportunism, will play to the gallery. He has neat soundbites that resonate with focus groups, but he will not be able to permanently hide from his own (sometimes collosal) failures of judgement (Northern Rock is one that springs to mind).

Even given all this, for Labour to transform the current Conservative advantage into a Brown victory, timing and momentum are crucial. In the last week of March and first week of April 1992, Labour was firmly positioned on the back foot. Misjudgements, mistakes, missed opportunities incrementally positioned Labour on the wrong side of the debate time and again. Momentum shifted decisively behind the Conservative campaign at the crucial juncture, with opinion polls pointing to a dead heat or even giving Major a slight lead as the finish line approached.

By the time of the Basildon result, Labour MPs and supporters knew the game was up. Early on Friday, April 9th, 1992, an exhausted Neil Kinnock, who had given everything for the Labour cause, was forced to concede an agonising defeat.

This year, with so much at stake and a tenacious Labour campaign already building, perhaps we can celebrate red rosetted cheers in Ribble South, or perhaps Pendle, in the early hours of May 7th (assuming the obvious), marking the point when David Cameron realises he’ll be staying in Notting Hill after all.