The UK’s responsibilities beyond our borders

By Jim Murphy MP / @jimmurphymp

In today’s world the prosperity, security, liberty and civil liberties of those at home cannot be separated from events beyond our borders. The era of a global recession and the global threat of terrorism prove that to any residual doubters. The UK needs a proactive, strong defence policy to protect our interests and values. A belief that you have responsibility beyond your borders is not, as some would have it, ideological, but, as we have seen over the last months, a necessary response to the world in which we live.

This has become a harder argument to make in recent years. I worry that a consequence of the conflict in Afghanistan will be that, combined with the legacy of Iraq, one and a half unpopular wars creates a permanently unpopular concept. This is evidenced in split public opinion towards operations in Libya, and the possibility that Britain will over the long-term develop a more limited security policy. Events in North Africa and the Middle East have shown, however, that we cannot afford to duck out of global events and the Conservatives’ previously declared narrow view of Britain’s place and role in the world is misguided.

IPPR has previously identified an ‘arc of instability’ ranging from states in West Africa to Central and Southeast Asia, a piece of work which usefully underlines how social, political, economic and military indicators can combine to increase risk of conflict in states across the world. But there is a State missing from that analysis which also poses a threat: the State of Ambivalence. In the State of Ambivalence we would still believe in the values of human rights and democracy, and believe that they should apply worldwide, but we may not so readily stand up for them. The danger of such ambivalence would be that in those states where the risk of conflict is highest, its drivers would be able to proceed unabated.

It is vital that we continue to make the case publicly and effectively for our duty to act on the responsibilities we have beyond our borders. The big challenge for policy-makers is in what form this responsibility should manifest itself, what type of intervention is legitimate and how and when it should be acted upon.

When to intervene?

The UN resolution on the Responsibility to Protect, agreed at the biggest ever General Assembly of 94 nations, rightly focuses on preventing and halting four crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. This doctrine holds that a nation state has primary responsibility for protecting its population from these crimes, but that if it cannot do so, the international community has a responsibility to intervene – most often through political and diplomatic measure, but on some occasions and as a last resort, with military force. It was unforgivable that the international community failed to respond to Rwanda in this way, but it is encouraging that efforts have since been made to protect citizens from mass atrocities. The recent decision to intervene in Libya was, as Hilary Clinton has said, a “watershed moment for international decision-making”. Not only did it assemble a wide political coalition from Africa and the Arab world and a more narrow military coalition in favour of action. It was also the first time the Responsibility to Protect has been invoked in a Security Council Resolution in order to legitimise military action.

As internationalists Labour had both the responsibility and the opportunity to support the UN Resolution and help enforce international law and save innocents from slaughter in Libya. The key criteria for action existed in this case: it was a just cause with a feasible mission and had international support. Inaction would have undermined the cause of freedom not just for the hundreds of thousands of people who have risen up against Gaddafi in Libya, but in other countries too where people are demanding democratic change. The international community through the UN has made a clear and robust commitment to tackling what is unacceptable in the world.

But one of the questions now being asked is to what extent is the Libyan model of intervention a sign of a new and genuine multilateralism, and what does it mean for future – and perhaps more complex – situations where intervention may be required?

During the 1990s, the administration of George Bush Senior in the United States intervened to prevent famine in Somalia, with Security Council Resolution (SCR) authorisation for “all necessary means” to establish security. US-led efforts to restore an elected leader to power in Haiti in 1994 were authorised by SCR 1940. Three separate SCRs authorised action to end the war in Bosnia in 1992-3. The UN also authorised the intervention in Afghanistan in 2002, following the September 11 attacks. However, UN backing has not always been forthcoming in operations which Britain has considered to be morally just. While SCR 688 supported action in Northern Iraq in 1991 to end the repression of the Kurdish population, some action taken, including the no-fly-zone, was beyond its terms. NATO members sought SCR authorisation to intervene in Kosovo in 1999 but did not receive it and intervened nonetheless on the grounds of diverting humanitarian catastrophe. The UK intervened in Sierra Leone in 2000 to help halt civil war, but without Security Council authorisation for the use of force.

At the time of Kosovo, then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan said, “To those for whom the greatest threat to international order is the use of force in the absence of a Security Council mandate, one might ask – not in the context of Kosovo – but in the context of Rwanda: If in those dark days and hours leading up to the genocide, a coalition of states had been prepared to act in defence of the Tutsi population, but did not receive prompt authorisation, should such a coalition have stood aside and allowed the horror to unfold?”

Multilateralism must be our optimum model and diplomatic options should always be exhausted before any military action is considered. But while multilateralism does not bring impotence, neither does it bring omnipotence, and the question of where the UK and the EU sit on the spectrum between binding international multilateralism, of the sort we have seen in Libya, and ad-hoc military and diplomatic coalitions, of the sort we saw in Kosovo, is an issue we will continue to debate.

How to intervene?

If Labour is to advocate an interventionist posture, however, we need to demonstrate how we believe our principles can be put into practice, demonstrating in particular that we have learnt the lessons of our recent experiences for UK security policy.

The first aspect of this is ensuring the UK has the necessary military capabilities. The dawn of the Arab Spring means we operate in a new security landscape which requires us to reconsider the decisions made in the Government’s defence review. William Hague has said that we are living through events as significant as 9/11. The UK Government in 2002 introduced a new chapter to the defence review and increased defence spending. In 1981 Thatcher reopened the Nott review to prepare for the Falklands conflict and reintroduced naval capabilities, including an aircraft carrier. It would be the sign of a confident Government today to think again about its defence retrenchment.

The second aspect is demonstrating that the post conflict peace plan is a core part of the pre-conflict battle plan. In Afghanistan the ‘build’ phase of the ‘clear, hold, build’ strategy is crucial. Stability will be based as much on the extent to which we support systems which empower people and enable sustainable self-determination as it will bilateral government agreements and military action.

The third lesson is that UK strategy requires advanced conflict prevention based on better co-ordination of defence and development. Internal oppression has been revealed to be one of the biggest security threats we face. Power without legitimate authority means that authoritarian governments act in ways that may necessitate an international response, so pre-emptive interventionist action is important. For those countries with whom we have a working relationship, or whose failure threatens international security, we must be in the business of building capacity in a way that does not leave Western-created administrations dependent on overseas aid, but that enables effective national and local governance, frameworks for civil justice, the functioning rule of law and a legitimate civil police. This means recasting our notion of intervention so that we recognise where the freedom to create societies, economies and administrations does not exist due to the suppression of legitimate calls for change and ensure Britain and our partners are part of the process by which those calls are answered.

The fourth lesson is that UK defence policy should be based on a new multilateralism. Humanitarian military action should not only be seen to be driven by a particular cluster of nations. The need for international co-ordination plus domestic pressures on defence budgets means a big challenge for UK defence policy is how we strengthen our own posture through multilateral action.

That means forming new defence partnerships, with the bilateral agreement signed between the UK and France in November 2010 being a positive first step. It also means strengthening multilateral institutions. Democratic procedures by which international decisions can be made must be more flexible and representative, but they are the best means we have to establish common ground for collective action. A strong African Union and strong Arab League are desirable, and so we should help build their capacity and encourage their participation. The leadership the African nations have played within the UN pressing for the shift from non-interference to non-indifference is welcome and to be congratulated, but needs to be backed with action. Multilateralism is a particularly important agenda for Britain. We are the only nation with a place on the Security Council, in the EU, in NATO, in the Commonwealth and as part of the G20, which gives us unique diplomatic reach, and so developing the role of those institutions can help us retain a strong role in unfolding world events.

A new emphasis on multilateralism in defence should also mean a new approach to conflict resolution through regional political reconciliation. In Afghanistan the indispensible political settlement inside the country is dependent on the political settlement outside. In Libya the Arab League will play an important role in diplomatic efforts to determine Libya’s long-term political future.

A fifth lesson is on Defence Diplomacy. The anger about Iraq should not be allowed to trump the shame of Rwanda, and so we must make our case effectively. That means making clear the intentions behind military actions as well as countering our enemies’ propaganda for domestic and international audiences; fostering serious debate about international rights and responsibilities with diaspora at home and abroad; and breaking down the barriers between the military, political and civilian worlds.

Conclusion

This debate on intervention goes to the heart of our interpretation of sovereignty. Sovereignty of course describes power over territory and politics, but when the events within borders are connected with transnational trends the retention and stability of sovereignty is linked to our engagement with what happens overseas

We are witnessing around the world shifts between types of sovereignty. Professor Philip Bobbit of the University of Texas has described the shift from opaque to transparent sovereignty. Opaque sovereignty, where events and actions within borders were only the business of domestic authorities, is, thanks to globalisation, the rise of technology, media, a sense of universal entitlement and multilateralism, giving way to a more transparent sovereignty in many parts of the world, where events have significance and implications across borders and national interest is often entwined with events overseas. In the Middle East we are seeing this shift from opaque to transparent sovereignty taking place rapidly before our eyes and we should help the process succeed.

This essay was first published by ippr.