Labour is right to resist calls for NATO to establish a no-fly zone over Ukraine

Russia started the war in Ukraine in 2014, but this new phase is just two weeks old. Two things we can say about it are that its character is still emerging, and that we do not know its future course.

The UK and our allies have been steadfast in our provision of military support: defensive weapons to fight the Russian invaders, and, between 2015 and last month, training for the Ukrainian army and navy. This military support sits alongside the international sanctions designed to cripple the Russian regime and alongside the humanitarian aid making its way into Ukraine and neighbouring countries. Evidence of Russian crimes is already being gathered in order to ensure justice and accountability, and Keir Starmer has rightly called on the government to begin planning now for a tribunal that will deliver that justice.

As the number of Ukrainian refugees increases and the scale of the humanitarian challenge becomes starker, there have been calls for NATO to establish a no-fly zone over Ukraine. The motive is sound, honourable. The method is not. The Labour frontbench is right to resist the idea.

The war in Ukraine is different from previous conflicts where no-fly zones have been used. A no-fly zone is a volume of airspace from which the sovereign power is excluded. By initiating NATO air operations over Ukraine, we would be doing something different: seeking to gain and maintain control of the air on behalf of a sovereign power under attack from a politically determined enemy.

An air war over Ukraine wouldn’t be a defensive act: it would add a new dimension to the conflict, one in which NATO is pursuing a defensive strategy insofar as we seek to protect Alliance territory but is taking offensive tactical action in pursuit of a different goal in Ukraine. By using examples of past no-fly zones to argue for air operations in Ukraine, some commentators fail the first test of judgement required of those advocating war: not understanding the kind of war on which they (or in fact, others) would be embarking.

We shouldn’t imagine that fighting for control of the air over Ukraine would be cost-free for NATO. Aircraft and aircrew are expensive and take time to replace. On 1st March 2022, Estonia’s Prime Minister Kaja Kallas called for NATO to move from peacetime air policing to an air defence posture. This is a formal step in NATO’s crisis response system. If NATO agrees this, it will be important that the Alliance preserves its fighter force, rather than risking it. In essence, it is there to deter, and to fight if necessary.

May 1940, not Bosnia or Libya, provides a more relevant historical lesson: faced with political demands to send fighter aircraft to cover the French Army, the head of RAF Fighter Command argued successfully that sending more fighter aircraft to France in a doomed attempt to help stop the Nazi blitzkrieg would leave him unable to defend the UK. Putin’s air force is engaged in a ‘deadly interactive dance’ with its Ukrainian opponents. Unlike 1940, the invading fascist force is not achieving its objectives at its expected rate. Ukrainian air force pilots are fighting with the same courage and determination as their comrades on the ground and are imposing costs on Putin.

Were NATO to attempt to achieve control of the air over Ukraine, the outcome we seek to avoid – further Russian violence in Ukraine and a widening of the conflict to include NATO – is made more likely. A NATO air operation over Ukraine wouldn’t risk war with Russia, it would be war with Russia, and observers claiming that it offers ‘commitment without entanglement’ are mistaken.

There are no guarantees that Putin’s response to a NATO air operation would be confined either to the air environment or to Ukraine. In fact, given the performance in the war to date of the Russian air force, there might be good reasons for Putin to retaliate and/or escalate elsewhere: war is a clash of wills, and we should consider any Russian response to our acts through a wide lens.

In Libya, NATO intervened with the stated aim of protecting a civilian population. NATO’s involvement ended in the fall of a regime and the death of a dictator. NATO’s actions in Libya, and before that in the Balkans, had a humanitarian aim, and while they were judged a success in their own terms the outcome included elements that had not formed part of the original intent. As we seek to modify the behaviour of the Russian regime, not to change the regime, we should carefully consider how our actions may be perceived by Putin.

If Putin observes NATO preparing to initiate air operations over Ukraine, he may not draw the conclusions we intend. Such preparations could shift Putin’s motive from one of national interest (as he sees it) to one of fear. Faced with an apparent threat to the survival of his regime, he could respond with the most dangerous course of action. Russian military doctrine makes it clear that Russia “reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to… aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.” Avoiding the act that your nuclear-armed adversary most fears isn’t ‘appeasement’ – it’s prudent.

For as long as there is a functioning Ukrainian government, Putin will struggle to claim victory. NATO members should continue to deliver arms to Ukraine for as long as we can. Providing more advanced weapons to increase Ukraine’s military capability might provide a means to test Putin’s commitment in a way that either side can pull back from.

The international community should be delivering food, medical supplies and fuel to Ukraine. Doing so helps address the rapidly emerging humanitarian crisis in Ukraine and it helps to sustain the government in Kyiv. Aid flights, perhaps conducted by a neutral or third party, are a non-hostile, humanitarian act. As well as providing tangible support to Ukraine, they, too, place some of the burden of avoiding escalation back onto Putin.