Jack Straw says British involvement in Iraq was never informed by a desire for regime change

By Alex Smith / @alexsmith1982

Jack Straw gave evidence to the Chilcot Inquiry today, and said that the case for going to war was always based on the perceived threat of weapons of mass destruction – and was not informed or influenced directly by American pressure for “regime change”.

Shortly before Mr Straw arrived to speak to the Inquiry, an 8,000-word written evidence memo was presented to the panel in which the former Foreign Secretary said:

“My decision to support military action in respect of Iraq was the most difficult decision I have ever faced in my life…I was also fully aware that my support for military action was critical. If I had refused that, the UK’s participation in the military action would not, in practice, have been possible. There almost certainly would have been no majority either in cabinet or in the Commons.”

The memo continued:

“I have never backed away from it and I do not intend to do so, and fully accept the responsibilities which flow from that. I believed at the time, and I still believe, that we made the best judgments we could have done in the circumstances.”

“I had never wanted war. But the strategy we had adopted to secure Iraq’s disarmament was diplomacy backed by the threat of force. Reluctantly but firmly I came to the view that to enforce Iraq’s disarmament obligations, we had no option but to proceed with military action if Saddam Hussein did not respond to a final ultimatum which would be part of the decision to take this action.”

The memo can now be read in full on the Chilcot Inquiry’s website.

During Straw’s oral evidence, he said the level of consensus that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction was “very broad” but was concerned that “we weren’t getting as much intelligence as we ought to” – and he had complained to the MI6 on these grounds.

Nevertheless, he said the WMDs were the sole motivation for war from a British foreign policy perspective:

“Whatever the policy of the United States – which as it happens was for regime change as a purpose of foreign policy – that was off the agenda so far as the United Kingdom was concerned.

I certainly – and always had done, in the abstract and in reality – accepted that you could have a diplomatic strategy for a different purpose which had to be backed by the threat, or if necessary the use of force; but a policy objective of regime change I regarded as improper and also self-evidently unlawful.

But leave aside the lawfulness of it: it had no chance of being a runner in the UK. It would not have got my support.

The case therefore stood or fell on whether Iraq posed a threat to international peace and security by reasons of its weapons of mass destruction, not on whether it had an extremely unpleasant authoritarian regime that was butchering its own people, because in international law, that is not a good grounds for intervention by other states.”

The video of this section can be found here.

Mr Straw’s memo also revealed that he had been in a position as foreign secretary to block the war had he wanted to. Asked in person whether he had ever contemplated resigning over the war, Straw said:

“I never got to that point. I have been very anxious in all of this not to put a gloss on what I was thinking at the time. You’re historians. It’s very easy to do. Had I not got agreement that we had to have a series of debates on substantive resolutions…then I would not have been able to continue in my job. Did I ever think I’m going to resign over this. No. We all have our bottom lines.”

So the Commons vote in favour of going to war was critical.

Straw also confirmed that he had asked Tony Blair at the last moment whether there were any alternatives to war still left on the table. Blair will appear before the Inquiry next Friday.