Labour needs an inquiry to understand why it failed

When Labour lost the 2015 general election, Margaret Beckett was asked by the national executive committee (NEC) to conduct an inquiry into our defeat. Her report identified four reasons why we lost: a failure to build trust on the economy; an inability to connect with centre-ground voters; a leader judged to be insufficiently strong; and a fear of the SNP. It would be hard to argue that any of these issues were subsequently corrected, nor any lessons learnt. When Labour lost again in 2017, no similar inquiry was carried out to understand why. By celebrating defeat rather than seeking to understand it, the party again failed to learn the lessons of loss. 

Now, with Labour suffering its worst election result since 1935, reduced to barely more than 200 MPs, it is imperative that the NEC asks a senior party figure who is unconnected to the leadership to conduct a thorough inquiry into the causes of this failure. And in my view, any such inquiry must, at a minimum, consider four issues. 

First, why Jeremy Corbyn agreed to Boris Johnson’s request for a December election. With food bank use, rough sleeping, and NHS waiting lists all soaring, there was a moral imperative to decide on an election not out of vanity or hubris, but when it looked most winnable. Any inquiry into this defeat needs to examine why, when Labour was consistently behind in the polls, when figures across the party were imploring the leadership not to agree to an election, and when Boris Johnson was practically begging us to vote for one, Jeremy Corbyn enthusiastically obliged. It also needs to ascertain what truth there is to reports that when internal polling predicted Labour would end up with fewer than 200 seats, it was “angrily dismissed” by the leader. Let’s have that polling released as part of this review so we know what information the Leadership’s decision to support an election was based upon. 

Second, any inquiry must consider the unparalleled unpopularity of the leader and the impact this had on the election. We know from past elections that leadership ratings are invariably the most accurate predictors of election results. We also know that Jeremy Corbyn was the most unpopular leader of the opposition since polling records began. On the question of who would make the most capable Prime Minister, he scored only 15%. In focus groups, consistently voters’ biggest concern was Labour’s leader. Such was his unpopularity that even on the NHS, the Tory leader was more trusted than the Labour leader. At the election, amongst those voters who switched from Labour to the Conservatives, 45% – by far the biggest percentage – said their reason was Jeremy Corbyn. And of course in doorstep conversations, the issue of Jeremy Corbyn came up more than any other.

Any inquiry must be frank and honest about this issue, however painful that may be. Polling and focus group data should be considered, and testimony should be taken from candidates – both those who won and those who lost – to understand how voters really responded to Labour’s leader, the leadership attributes they value, and which were most costly to Labour’s chances.

Third, any inquiry needs to understand what role Brexit played in this defeat. Some have sought to argue Brexit was the sole reason for Labour losing. But if we are to win again, it is vital we learn the right lessons, rather than defaulting to explanations that are either politically expedient, reinforce existing prejudices, or settle old scores. This means rooting our analysis in facts and data. And certainly the facts currently available strongly suggest Brexit was not the principle cause of Labour’s defeat.

Polling data reveals the issue of Brexit was a distant third amongst those voters who had concerns about Labour – with 19% citing our stance on Brexit, compared to 46% saying they didn’t like Jeremy Corbyn, and 20% saying they didn’t believe Labour’s manifesto promises. Focus group research shows Brexit to be the third biggest concern of Labour Leave voters – behind concerns about Jeremy Corbyn and concerns over spending. And evidence from the doorstep, particularly from former MPs who lost their seats, suggests for every one voter who mentioned Brexit, four or five mentioned the leadership. Crucially, in the election Labour’s vote went down markedly everywhere – in Remain seats as well as Leave seats – so Brexit can only be one part of a much larger story.

Of course, Brexit is the most important issue Britain has faced in a generation, and it was the issue Boris Johnson sought to define the election on, so it would be absurd to suggest it played no role. Any inquiry therefore needs to consider what impact the leader staying neutral on an issue of such magnitude had; how his indecision over Brexit impacted on perceptions of Labour; and how effectively Labour’s eventual policy was communicated. For example, often Labour MPs were asked to vote against a Brexit deal in parliament without any ‘air cover’ narrative explaining why from the leadership.

A review also needs to consider the counter-factual: what if Labour had supported a Brexit deal in parliament? When authenticity is at a premium, how credible would Labour MPs have been in voting for a deal they knew reduced GDP in the North East by 11%, in the North West by 12%, and in the West Midlands by 13%? What impact would this have had on Labour’s vote, when even in Leave seats a majority of Labour voters voted Remain? And would Labour supporting Brexit really have been the silver bullet some have suggested? It is much more likely that the disconnect between Jeremy Corbyn and Labour’s heartlands is far more profound than on one prominent issue alone. Let’s use an inquiry to dig a little deeper, so we can understand what deep-seated issues stopped these voters from trusting Labour and prevented us from connecting with them.

Finally, the fourth issue any inquiry needs to consider is whether Labour’s manifesto played a positive or negative role in Labour’s election performance. Some argue that the manifesto was hugely popular with voters and that therefore Corbynism without Corbyn is now the answer. But what actual evidence is there that Labour’s manifesto was popular?

Any review will likely need to build understanding of the fact that just because individual retail policies poll well in isolation, that doesn’t necessarily mean they will be popular when collected together, nor that with large increases in borrowing and spending, they won’t crater an already fragile perception of economic competence. Any manifesto needs to form a coherent narrative; it needs to prioritise – and in its priorities it needs to reflect the priorities of the British people.