A CRaG-y step in a long revolutionary march

By David Carrington

Britain’s evolving constitution will mutate again if the Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill (CRaG), carried over in the Queen’s Speech, makes it onto the statute books. CRaG mops up the House of Lords reform by ending by-elections for hereditary peers and addresses the National Audit Office, but an aspect of the bill that invites closer inspection is the change made to executive power.

Executive power in the UK has always been a constitutional anomaly compared to most other western liberal democracies being formed within the legislative branch. This historical phenomenon dates back to the origins of our constitutional monarchy in the Civil War, and its sequel the Glorious Revolution.

However, the nature of modern politics and the drive for greater accountability pose challenges and, in two particular actions, CRaG does adjust some powers possessed by the executive in the UK. By removing the Prime Minister from the process of appointments of the President, Deputy President and Justices of the Supreme Court and creating a statutory basis for the scrutiny of treaties by Parliament, CRaG strengthens the power of Parliament and provides a model for future constitutional reform.

Without a destructive revolutionary act since 1688, constitutional development in the UK has evolved with social, economic and political pressures all playing a role. This slow development can now take a democratic leap forward, as the conditions are right to bring about further radical reform of the British constitution after the next election.

Labour is committed to reforming the House of Lords to incorporate an elected second chamber, a hot topic for a century since the Parliament Act of 1911. One of the reasons that Lords reform has taken such a long time is the difficulty in defining exactly how the Lords should be reformed. The supremacy of the Commons developed and was justified on its status as the only elected Parliamentary body, so creating a second elected chamber risks challenging this supremacy. This makes reform of the Lords in conjunction with wider reform of the Commons a must.

The House of Lords could be elected on a proportional basis from constituencies akin to those used in European Parliamentary elections, incorporating a nod to the devolved bodies in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and London (prompting a reconsideration of English regional government). A reformed Lords (perhaps renamed as the Senate, Upper House, or simply Westminster Zoo) could be a scrutinising body for legislation arising from the Commons and the devolved bodies, with additional oversight of secondary legislation from government agencies and executive action. This body could also be responsible for confirming executive appointments (ministers, members of the judiciary, etc), which brings me onto my final proposal.

As a confirmed republican it pains me to say this but no serious party will campaign for the end of the monarchy in 2010 election. However, this does not stifle republican reforms. The power of the Prime Minister, Cabinet and junior ministers, is drawn from the Crown and by reforming the nature of power available to the executive we can radically revise its operation. Bringing in confirmation hearings for ministerial and other appointments would allow effective democratic control over their appointment, which does not currently exist.

It should also be possible to limit membership of the executive to members of the Commons, to keep a distinction between the scrutinisers of the executive and the executive itself. With fixed term limits for parliaments there would be a clear picture of who holds power, why they hold it and a limit on how long they could possess it for. Following on from CRaG, we should remove some of the prerogative powers the executive possesses, which are currently beyond Parliamentary control, and place them in the hands of Parliament.

CRaG does this with the ratification of treaties and there has been greater recognition in recent years that momentous decisions, such as declaring war, should be politically accountable. The debate and vote on the Iraq War was one such example. We can debate the background and content of that debate but we must also recognise that it represented a new precedent in bringing acts of war under Parliamentary control.

This all involves a radical reconsideration of politics and our political culture. One effect is to end the possibility of so-called governments of all the talents (GOATs) but democratic reform and greater accountability of the executive is necessary to make governments more talented.

There is currently an appetite for increased accountability in politics, as it appears remote and unbound and this can’t continue. We are being conditioned to thirst for democratic control over our lives (look at the X Factor and the rage that emanates from a perception that decisions don’t reflect the public will) and, although GOATs have been seen as a solution to tackling public disenchantment, it can only be tackled at the source in the long term by addressing the perception of remoteness and unaccountability of politicians.

The democratic impulse has always been a key part of the left’s march in Britain, going back to the Civil War, through the Chartists and the history of the Labour movement and we need to reconsider these radical ideas. The solution to the political malaise embodied by expenses scandals and low electoral turnouts is not to neuter Parliament (as some parties would have it), but to clarify its power and embolden it with proper authority and accountability.